Infinite Horizon Noncooperative Differential Games

dc.contributor.areaMathematicsen_US
dc.contributor.authorBressan, Albertoen_US
dc.contributor.authorPriuli, Fabio S.en_US
dc.contributor.departmentFunctional Analysis and Applicationsen_US
dc.date.accessioned2005en_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-09-07T20:27:45Z
dc.date.available2005en_US
dc.date.available2011-09-07T20:27:45Z
dc.date.issued2005en_US
dc.description.abstractFor a non-cooperative differential game, the value functions of the various players satisfy a system of Hamilton-Jacobi equations. In the present paper, we consider a class of infinite-horizon games with nonlinear costs exponentially discounted in time. By the analysis of the value functions, we establish the existence of Nash equilibrium solutions in feedback form and provide results and counterexamples on their uniqueness and stability.en_US
dc.format.extent267217 bytesen_US
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdfen_US
dc.identifier.citationJ. Differential Equations 227 (2006) 230-257en_US
dc.identifier.urihttps://openscience.sissa.it/handle/1963/1720en_US
dc.language.isoen_USen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesSISSA;31/2005/Men_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesarXiv.org;math.AP/0505212en_US
dc.relation.uri10.1016/j.jde.2006.01.005en_US
dc.titleInfinite Horizon Noncooperative Differential Gamesen_US
dc.typePreprinten_US
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